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ALEKSANDER KOPKA 
Mourning and Grievability:
Several Remarks on Judith Butler’s 
Politics of Living Together
In this article, I focus on the function of the notions of 
precariousness, vulnerability, and grievability of life in Judith 
Butler’s writings, and reflect upon their place in a broader 
context of the thought of what I call, following Jacques 
Derrida, “originary mourning.” On the one hand, therefore, 
I want to reconstruct Butler’s task of rethinking the possibi-
lity of creating a community based on the equal allocation of 
precariousness and grievability. Such a reflection allows 
Butler to treat grievability as an insightful and unique 
passageway to the problematics of safeguarding of life and 
equality between living beings. On the other hand, by 
referring to the writings of Jacques Derrida, I want to 
inscribe Butler’s notions of precariousness and grievability in 
a broader framework of mourning, to show how every 
constitution of a social bond based on the principle of shared 
precariousness and vulnerability inevitably has to come up 
against the paradox of its genesis.






But at what cost do I establish the familiar as the 
criterion by which a human life is grievable?
 (Butler 2004, 38)
Introduction
When dealing with mourning, one inevitably faces at least a few insistent 
questions. First of all, what do we mourn? Do we mourn someone’s life 
or death? And if we mourn life, what does this notion of life really stand 
for? Going further, in whose name does one mourn, one’s own, or the 
dead’s? And finally, what does it mean to mourn (this or that life) well?
To answer some of these questions provisionally, maybe even too 
hastily, perhaps in mourning we respond before and to some who, to 
some other who passes for life and who – regarded as a life that passes 
away, sometimes before our very own eyes – allows us to think of its 
precariousness. Thus, could thinking of life in terms of our mournful 
relation to it help us pave the way for the question of responsibility and 
politics, or for what every politics should essentially be, namely, a poli-
tics of responsibility?
The trajectories of these insistent questions meet each other in Judith 
Butler’s texts on grievability and precariousness, in which she endeavors 
to rethink politics in the light of its relation to grief and mourning. As 
she states in her essay “Violence, Mourning, Politics,” “I propose to 
consider a dimension of political life that has to do with our exposure 
to violence, and our complicity in it, with our vulnerability to loss and 
the task of mourning that follows, and with finding a basis for commu-
nity in these conditions” (Butler 2004, 19).
The above-mentioned essay is a part of a larger collection of pieces 
written by Butler in response to what happened in the United States in 
the aftermath of “September 11” – an event that revealed the country’s 
unseen, or even incomprehensible, vulnerability. But, as Butler argues, 
rather than to reshape its foreign policy in alliance with the global com-
munity and in an effort to prevent such acts of terror, the United States 
engaged in a nationalistic narrative, hardening the “get out of our way” 
policy, and allowing auto-aggressive activities such as mass surveillance, 
censorship, the suspension of civil rights and liberties, or the persecution 
of political dissent.
Furthermore, the disclosure of vulnerability and exposure to loss and 
grief have inevitably been translated into mechanisms and strategies of 





context, Butler argues that the phenomenon and the domain of mour-
ning and grievability have not been exempted from political influence. 
She does that by describing how politics, especially in the United States, 
has subjugated private and public mourning to its ends. Thus, for Butler, 
the fact “[t]he violence that [the United States] inflict on others is only 
– and always – selectively brought into public view” (Butler 2004, 39) 
is reflected in and strictly connected to mechanisms of state-regulated 
public mourning. Therefore, the latter must be “protracted and rituali-
zed, stoking nationalist fervor, reiterating the conditions of loss and 
victimization that come to justify a more or less permanent war” (Butler 
2004, xix). Thus, Butler starts from a critical approach to the pheno-
menon of mourning, treating it as a yet another domain of public life 
subjected to state manipulation and violence, by situating this critique 
in the context of the post-9/11 situation of the United States (cf. Butler 
2016, 38) only to move later to the general question of grievability. For, 
according to Butler, the norms and framing of grievability imposed on 
people by the state apparatus with the compliant mass media aim, in 
general, to distinguish between lives that are worthy and unworthy of 
our grief, and therefore, worthy and unworthy of living since, as she 
argues, the derealization of loss leads inevitably to the dehumanization 
of potential victims.1 Already in Antigone’s Claim, Butler had brought 
1 The notion of grievability can be interpreted as an expansion of the distinc-
tion between worthy and unworthy victims of political violence. As Edward S. 
Herman and Noam Chomsky argue in Manufacturing Consent, “[a] propaganda 
system will consistently portray people abused in enemy states as worthy victims, 
whereas those treated with equal or greater severity by its own government or 
clients will be unworthy. The evidence of worth may be read from the extent and 
character of attention and indignation. [...] While this differential treatment occurs 
on a large scale, the media, intellectuals, and public are able to remain unconscious 
of the fact and maintain a high moral and self-righteous tone. This is evidence of 
an extremely effective propaganda system” (Herman, Chomsky 1994, 37, cf. 
Chomsky 2001, 10-11). However, Butler fails to indicate this quite obvious 
proximity of her diagnosis to Herman and Chomsky’s work. Nevertheless, this 
proximity remains quite vivid, especially when it comes to the question of “fra-
ming” singular lives, groups, and populations by the state and mass media pro-
paganda. As Butler asserts, “[t]he distinction between populations that are worth 
violently defending and those that are not implies that some lives are simply 
considered more valuable than others” (Butler 2020, 55). This remark is tied 
directly to the question of grievability: “forms of racism instituted and active at 
the level of perception tend to produce iconic versions of populations who are 
eminently grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable. 
The differential distribution of grievability across populations has implications 
for why and when we feel politically consequential affective dispositions such as 
horror, guilt, righteous sadism, loss, and indifference” (Butler 2016, 24).
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to the fore those relations that are denied political legitimacy and as 
such are considered neither dead nor alive:
it is not simply that these are relations that cannot be honored, cannot be openly 
acknowledged, and cannot therefore be publicly grieved, but that these relations 
involve persons who are also restricted in the very act of grieving, who are denied 
the power to confer legitimacy on loss” (Butler 2000, 79).
Thus, how public mourning is produced and managed cannot be, in 
Butler’s view, dissociated from the operations and mechanisms of dere-
alization, namely, of not taking the suffering of the excluded others into 
account. Moreover, such a derealization achieved through prohibitions 
and exclusions imposed on public mourning is constitutive of the public 
sphere. “The public will be created on the condition that certain images 
do not appear in the media, certain names of the dead are not utterable, 
certain losses are not avowed as losses, and violence is derealized and 
diffused” (Butler 2004, 37-38).
Of course, for Butler, this is not a one-way street, and both grief and 
mourning also have the potential to challenge the order according to 
which some lives can be deemed unworthy or ungrievable (and their 
eradication can be justified). In fact, for Butler, mourning has a trans-
formative potential – which she identifies with the “transformative effect 
of loss” (Butler 2004, 21)2 – even at the level of international relations 
between nation states. If mourning becomes more hospitable, if it affirms 
those dead or alive who are denied legitimacy by political institutions 
or the public sphere, then demand for recognition and new forms of 
living together will follow. If the reactions and fantasies of narcissistic 
and nationalistic entitlement and vilification can be overcome in public 
mourning, then
[...] from the subsequent experience of loss and fragility [...] the possibility of 
making different kinds of ties emerges. Such mourning might (or could) effect 
a transformation in our sense of international ties that would crucially rearti-
culate the possibility of democratic political culture here and elsewhere. (Butler 
2004, 40)
Butler uses this diagnosis as a point of departure to argue that the con-
stitution of our communal or relational ties stems from our fundamen-
tal interdependency, which coincides intrinsically with our lives’ preca-
2 On the transformative potential of grief and mourning, see also bell hooks’ 





riousness and vulnerability. For Butler, it is precisely grief (or 
grievability)3 that has the force to push us towards the realization of this 
fundamental social entanglement and communal interrelationship. The 
following passage not only expresses this intention but can also be regar-
ded as a guiding thread for further reading of Butler’s essays gathered 
in Precarious Life, Frames of War, or in recently published The Force of 
Non-Violence.
Many people think that grief is privatizing, that it returns us to a solitary situ-
ation and is, in that sense, depoliticizing. But I think it furnishes a sense of 
political community of a complex order, and it does this first of all by bringing 
to the fore the relational ties that have implications for theorizing fundamental 
dependency and ethical responsibility. If my fate is not originally or finally 
separable from yours, then the “we” is traversed by a relationality that we cannot 
easily argue against; or, rather, we can argue against it, but we would be denying 
something fundamental about the social conditions of our very formation. 
(Butler 2004, 22-23)
The main presuppositions behind Butler’s argument are clear: the phan-
tasm of rugged individualism and full autonomy of the subject anterior 
to any social bond is questioned at its core; the fundamental interde-
pendency between human beings, along with its ethico-political injunc-
tion, is recognized and emphasized; the vulnerability and precariousness 
of lives are seen as the basis for this universal interdependency; and 
finally, grief provides an exceptional recognition and sense of this uni-
versal and essential condition of precariousness.
From Iterability to Ontology
What therefore is this ungrievable life? In various instances, Butler 
answers that the ungrievable life does not count as “real” (Butler 2004, 
33), “living” (Butler 2020, 68), “a life” (Butler 2020, 68-69), a life that 
will not be mourned or safeguarded (Butler 2020, 108). It is considered 
3 I will henceforth emphasize the difference between grievability and mour-
ning. In doing so, I will use the notion of grievability as defined by Butler. Also, 
I will use the notion of mourning either in a narrow sense, that is, as a social, 
political or psychological response to someone’s death, or in a wider sense – as 
originary mourning, namely, the condition for and of every response, referral, and 
consequently, every relation or bond between living (human and non-human) 
beings.
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not to be a life “in any full and meaningful sense” (Butler 2016, 43), 
but rather  “already the unburied, if not the unburiable” (Butler 2004, 
34). And finally, what seems, at least from a certain point of view,4 
inconsistent with the previous examples, it is a life subjected to calcu-
lation (Butler 2020, 107). Furthermore, in Frames of War, Butler makes 
a distinction between something apprehended as “living” and recognized 
as “a life,” which is not only an epistemological but also an ontological 
distinction. In fact, when confronting Butler’s argument, one inevitably 
gets the impression of unsolvable contamination of both the normative 
and the ontological order. Still, Butler argues that there is something 
about “living” that does not surrender itself to this ontological and 
normative production:
If a life is produced according to the norms by which life is recognized, this 
implies neither that everything about a life is produced according to such norms 
nor that we must reject the idea that there is a remainder of “life” – suspended 
and spectral – that limns and haunts every normative instance of life. Production 
is partial and is, indeed, perpetually haunted by its ontologically uncertain 
double. (Butler 2016, 7)
Political recognition is therefore ascribed to this normative production 
of the ontological status of “a life,” as opposed to its spectral remainder 
of “life” or “living,” which is not yet recognized as “a life.” However, it 
is necessary to emphasize that we cannot prescribe a normative telos for 
this ontologico-political production, regardless of Butler’s wish to esta-
blish a “utopic horizon within which theory and description must work” 
(Butler 2020, 106) as “an ideal of equal grievability” (Butler 2020, 107). 
At the same time, Butler states that our inability to finish such work 
successfully stems from the fact that its limit is “internal to normative 
construction itself, a function of its iterability and heterogeneity, without 
which it cannot exercise its crafting power, and which limits the finality 
of any of its effects” (Butler 2016, 7). Therefore, an ideal of equal grie-
4 On the one hand, one could argue that in the process of the allocation of 
grievability, both grievable and ungrievable lives are subjected to political calcu-
lation. On the other, one could point out that even in the case of “incalculable 
value of a life,” the passage through calculation is necessary. As Derrida points 
out in Rogues, “[c]alculable measure also gives access to the incalculable and the 
incommensurable, an access that remains itself necessarily undecided between the 
calculable and the incalculable – and that is the aporia of the political [...]” (Der-
rida 2005c, 52). A little bit later, he reaffirms that “[o]n both sides, then, whether 
it is a question of singularity or universality, and each time both at once, both 





vability would be unachievable not because of its infinite deferral, but 
rather due to the aporetic structure of iterability.
Jacques Derrida introduces the notion of iterability in his essay 
“Signature Event Context.” Now, iterability, in the broadest sense, is 
a structural possibility of repetition through alteration. Thereby, that 
the mark, as a unit of iterability, can only be repeated in the movement 
of its own erasure. It may also retain its signifying function in the absence 
of its referent or signified. Moreover, the possibility of the disappearance 
of the referent or the signified is necessarily implied in iterability, which 
makes the mark a grapheme, to wit, “the nonpresent remaining of a dif-
ferential mark cut off from its alleged ‘production’ or origin” (Derrida 
1984, 318). Consequently, there can be no fixed meaning attached to 
and salvaged by the mark.
While iterability consists in an ever-changing address to a nonpresent 
other, Derrida emphasizes that “[...] this absence is not a continuous 
modification of presence; it is a break in presence, ‘death,’ or the possi-
bility of the ‘death’ of the addressee, inscribed in the structure of the 
mark...” (Derrida 1984, 315). From the political point of view, iterabi-
lity, as the general structure of experience, would be the structural con-
dition of simultaneously producing and undoing any social bond. Fur-
thermore, the question of mortality would be inherent to the production 
of a social bond. Thus, rather than treat social bonds as essentially given, 
iterability requires us to promise and depend on an act of faith to main-
tain them. As Butler points out in her text on Derrida:
The promise must repeat, even mechanically, in order to hold firm as a bond of 
any kind. [...] The bond must be temporally renewable to qualify as a bond at 
all. [...] For Derrida, the promise, when given, becomes part of the structure of 
a covenant, and this social bond has no structural or necessary existence outside 
the memory that is reinvoked and the future that is opened up through its 
iteration. (Butler 2009, 302-303)
Now, since for Butler the notion of iterability is crucial for explaining 
the normative production of ontology (Butler 2016, 168), which, as an 
effect of iterability, cannot exhaust or fully explain what “living” could 
be about, then she cannot ascribe to such an ontology a fundamental 
character. And because in Butler’s argument the ultimate point of refe-
rence is the body, then iterability must condition the recognizability of 
the latter’s “life” or “being.” But, in trying to avoid the metaphysical 
entrapment of thinking about the experience of life in terms of what 
Derrida calls “the experience of Being: so-called presence” (Derrida 
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2005a, 317), Butler takes some necessary precautions by pointing out 
that the “being” of the body is always already inscribed – and can only 
be encountered – within political contexts which, according to the logic 
of iterability, means: “without any center of absolute anchoring” (Der-
rida 1984, 320). Therefore, as already exposed to forces of appropriation, 
interpretation, and framing, the body becomes, from the outset, a sub-
ject matter for social – but not fundamental – ontology. 
The “being” of the body to which this ontology refers is one that is always given 
over to others, to norms, to social and political organizations that have develo-
ped historically in order to maximize precariousness for some and minimize 
precariousness for others. It is not possible first to define the ontology of the 
body and then to refer to the social significations the body assumes. (Butler 
2016, 2-3)
Normative production, therefore, faces an insoluble problem with onto-
logically elusive “living.” Before any recognition can be made, we respond 
to living, which “falls outside the frame furnished by the norm, but only 
as a relentless double whose ontology cannot be secured, but whose 
living status is open to apprehension” (Butler 2016, 8). Thus, living 
exceeds the ontological frame through which we try to capture and 
explain it. The fact that something breaks outside of the frame, that the 
frame is never able to contain this living, disturbs our understanding of 
the world. Moreover, this problem is reproduced through the process 
of iterability, which, in turn, allows Butler to reject the structuralist 
concept of form and “to affirm something about the continuing life of 
poststructuralism, a preoccupation with notions such as living on, car-
rying on, carrying over, continuing, that form the temporal tasks of the 
body” (Butler 2016, 169). However, we have to be very careful how we 
interpret this “continuation” because what guarantees the sense of tem-
poral continuity is precisely the form, which itself is subjected to the 
work of iterability. Consequently, the body as an iterable mark cannot 
be understood in terms of temporal continuity (as previously stated by 
Derrida, the possibility of the mark implies the rupture of presence, and 
therefore, the interruption of temporal continuity). Living on, surviving, 
carrying on after someone’s death – all this involves a structural break 
with the dominant role of presence.
Otherwise, Butler would have to introduce a general form of tem-
porality (like the phenomenological form of the living present) under 
the aegis of which one could synthesize and reassemble the bodily marks. 
She would therefore resort to fundamental ontology. In order to avoid 
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this ontological absorption, we ought to think of the mark (used here 
synonymously with the “trace”) in terms of différance as an originary 
movement of deferring and differing, the spatialization of time, finally, 
as “the relation to an impossible presence, as expenditure without rese-
rve, as the irreparable loss of presence” (Derrida 1984, 19). Différance 
therefore
[...] maintains our relationship with that which we necessarily misconstrue, and 
which exceeds the alternative of presence and absence. A certain alterity [...] is 
definitively exempt from every process of presentation by means of which we 
would call upon it to show itself in person. (Derrida 1984, 20)
Consequently, for the bodily mark to exceed any, even the most funda-
mental, form, it has to be conceived as the dis-appearing trace:
The trace (of that) which can never be presented, the trace which itself can never 
be presented: that is, appear and manifest itself, as such, in its phenomenon. 
[...] Always differing and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the presentation 
of itself. It erases itself in presenting itself, muffles itself in resonating, [...] 
(Derrida 1984, 23)
Since the structure or movement of the mark (i.e., the trace), as pointed 
out before, necessarily coincides with the possibility of the death of the 
addressee (here, following Butler’s vocabulary, I am addressing the other 
as formally undetermined, as far as their resistance to ontological pro-
duction goes, “life” or “living”), then our response or our experience 
regarding this addressee is already entangled in mourning. Now, what 
that means is that death does not happen to us by accident, but rather 
has its crucial stake in the production of the mark: without the possi-
bility of disappearance of the addressee, and therefore, of surviving the 
addressee by the mark, the latter would not be able to function within 
the movement of iterability, and therefore, it would lose its signifying 
ability. Thereby, the surviving of the instant, the possibility of being 
repeated, has to attest to mortality (cf. Derrida 2005a, 158). As Michael 
Naas explains:
In the beginning, then, there is mourning – an originary mourning or melancholy 
that is not nostalgia for some lost presence but an affirmation that the testamen-
tary trace and a mourning for the other is the unchanging form of our lives. [...] 
More originary than death or being-towards-death, mourning for the other, or at 
least the structural possibility of such mourning, begins not at death but already 





From Mourning to Grievability
Thus, by connecting the question of mourning to the notions of itera-
bility and the mark, on which Butler grounds her idea of social ontology 
and interconnection between precarious lives, I do not want to consider 
mourning as a mere characteristic attributed to life. Rather, I argue that 
life has to be thought in terms of originary mourning, which as the very 
condition of life’s emergence extends its scope to every living (on).5
Similarly, Butler argues that her notion of grievability is a universal 
condition and can be applied not only to those who are dead but to every 
living being or every single body, as the “body implies mortality” (Butler 
2004, 26). Thereby, grievability relies primarily on the inevitability of 
death: “[a] life has value in relation to mortality” (Butler 2020, 75). 
Consequently, she ties the notion of grievability to the validation of life 
and an injunction for equality between living beings. As such, “grieva-
bility is a presupposition for the life that matters” (Butler 2016, 14):
[...] grievability is already operative in life, and that it is a characteristic attri-
buted to living creatures, marking their value within a differential scheme of 
values and bearing directly on the question of whether or not they are treated 
equally and in a just way. To be grievable is to be interpellated in such a way 
that you know your life matters; that the loss of your life would matter; that 
your body is treated as one that should be able to live and thrive, whose preca-
rity should be minimized, for which provisions for flourishing should be ava-
ilable. (Butler 2020, 59)
For Butler, therefore, life acquires its value on the condition that it is 
worthy of being grieved. However, we are left here with certain ambi-
guity about the precedence of grievability over the ontological produc-
tion of a life. Is grievability (or its opposite) attributed to an already 
ontologically determined life? And thereby, does it require at least some 
ontological founding or recognition? Is grievability a ontological con-
dition, or is the question of grievability determined only at the level of 
5 Butler’s mention of living on could be treated as a reference to Derrida’s 
notion of “living on” as synonymous with surviving. In The Politics of Friendship, 
Derrida states: “Surviving – that is the other name of a mourning whose possibi-
lity is never to be awaited. For one does not survive without mourning” (Derrida 
2005b, 13). Living as living on is therefore originarily structured by the necessity 
that someone has to die first, and someone else will have to continue to live: living 
on is living through death and after death insofar as one does not live on post 





political (or biopolitical) decision-making? Perhaps, by introducing the 
notion of grievability, Butler wants to offer an alternative to a normative 
recognition of life based on radical exclusion as a result of which those 
“dying from a lack of recognition,” those whose ontological status is 
suspended constitute “the ‘shadowy realm,’ which haunts the public 
sphere, which is precluded from the public institution of the human” 
(Butler 2000, 81). However, while Butler explicitly affirms that “grie-
vability is a condition of a life’s emergence and sustenance” and that 
“[w]ithout grievability, there is no life, or, rather, there is something 
living [my emphasis – A.K.] that is other than life,” on the very same 
page she states that “[g]rievability precedes and makes possible the appre-
hension of the living being as living [my emphasis – A.K.], exposed to 
non-life from the start” (Butler 2016, 15). Such inconsistencies make 
it more difficult to capture what grievability really means and when or 
where it begins, especially given that what can be apprehended as living 
is not necessarily recognized as a life (Butler 2016, 8).
Nevertheless, assuming its broadest meaning according to which 
grievability conditions apprehension of something as living (while appre-
hension “can imply marking, registering, acknowledging, without full 
cognition” [Butler 2016, 5], it is nevertheless “facilitated” by norms of 
recognition), one could still enquire as to where it begins and where it 
ends. It seems that this question is thoroughly political and strictly 
connected to the authority of the sovereign (i.e., the decision-maker). 
As Butler explains, “grievability is a characteristic attributed to a group 
of people [...] by some group or community, or within the terms of 
a discourse, or within the terms of a policy or institution” (Butler 2020, 
105). It begins therefore neither with a referral to someone or something, 
nor with an assumption of their mortality, but rather with attributing 
a value to their loss, to wit, with authorization of the loss: “people can 
be grieved or bear the attribute of grievability only to the extent that 
loss can be acknowledged” (Butler 2020, 105). As such, “grievability 
governs the way in which living creatures are managed, and it proves to 
be an integral dimension of biopolitics and of ways of thinking about 
equality among the living” (Butler 2020, 56). Therefore, I argue that 
grievability, as a political perspective and a decision of the sovereign, 
could only emerge from a more originary field of mourning, which is 
already set in motion with the referral.
First of all, as I have already mentioned, every referral, every address 
to the other (whether we are speaking about “a life” or “something living 
that is other than life”), since it is structured by the trace, is already 
ancillary to the “logic” of mourning. Mourning begins not with appre-
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hension, decision, or even a question about grievability but with the 
trace. Thus, it begins before any question about grievability can even be 
posed. Consequently, every “yes” that we express with regard to any 
form of living is already a response of mourning and in mourning.
[The “yes” of responsibility] echoes, always, like the response to a spectral injunc-
tion: the order comes down from a place that can be identified neither as a living 
present nor as the pure and simple absence of someone dead. 
This amounts to saying that the responsibility for this response has already quit 
the terrain of philosophy as ontology, or of ontology as a discourse about the 
effectivity of a present-being (on) [...] (Derrida 2008, 213-214)
Furthermore, originary mourning installs an irreducible aporia within 
our “epistemological capacity to apprehend life” (Butler 2016, 3), and 
ultimately, it keeps grievability failing: in a certain sense, every form of 
living, contingent upon the originary mourning, poses an unbearable 
challenge to anyone who tries to apprehend something or someone as 
grievable. That is also why one can object to the threat of mourning and 
protest in the words of Derrida reading Jean-François Lyotard: “there 
shall be no mourning.”
Over me, the phrase says, or at least the phrasing of the phrase says, you will 
not go into mourning. You will especially not organize mourning, and even less 
what is called the work of mourning. And of course the “no mourning,” left to 
itself, can mean the perpetual impossibility of mourning, an inconsolability or 
irreparability that no work of mourning shall ever come to mend. 
But the “no mourning” can also, by the same token, oppose testimony, 
attestation, protestation, or contestation, to the very idea of a testament, to the 
hypothesis of a mourning that always has, unfortunately, as we know, a negative 
side, at once laborious, guilt ridden and narcissistic, reactive and turned toward 
melancholy, if not envy. And when it borders on celebration, or wake, one risks 
the worst. (Derrida 2001b, 221)
Finally, I believe that grievability still occurs at the level of the subject’s 
authority (or what Levinas would call the imperialism of the same). It 
would mean that since grievability relies on the subject’s perception of 
other forms of living (even if it leads to the realization of certain kinship 
or bonding), it has to presuppose some kind of violence toward those 
others. As Levinas notices, “[i]f one could possess, grasp, and know the 





synonyms of power” (Levinas 1987, 90).6 Since grievability relies essen-
tially on the power of the sovereign to approach other living beings and 
the hegemony in attributing a value to them, then it has to involve this 
imperialistic violence.
In any case, violence seems irreducible, at least according to Derrida, 
for whom the only possible way to engage oneself with the other is 
through the iterable movement of the trace (which, in the context of 
the opposition between speech and writing, structures arche-writing).
To think the unique within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gesture 
of the arche-writing: arche-violence, loss of the proper, of absolute proximity, 
of self-presence, in truth the loss of what has never taken place, of a self-presence 
which has never been given but only dreamed of and always already split, 
repeated, incapable of appearing to itself except in its own disappearance. (Der-
rida 2016, 121)
Let us parse this sentence out while keeping the question of originary 
mourning and grievability in mind. The inscription of the other within 
the structure/movement of iterability is necessary to establish any kind 
of relationship with the other. This, of course, just like any effort of 
appropriation, apprehension, or recognition of the other, must involve 
violence. Moreover, the structure of trace (implied in arche-writing) has 
to, as I showed before, assume at least the possibility of the other’s and 
my own disappearance (which would be “the loss of what has never 
taken place”), and by the same token, it embodies the originarity of 
mourning after the loss of what (or who) has never taken place within 
this imperial scope. Concurrently, since the condition of the trace’s 
appearance is its disappearance, it has to signal a certain renunciation 
6 Derrida refers to the same passage from Time and the Other in his essay 
“Violence and Metaphysics.” He describes there the violence and dominance 
which unavoidably coincides with bringing the alterity of the other to the light 
of phenomenology and ontology: “The ancient clandestine friendship between 
light and power, the ancient complicity between theoretical objectivity and tech-
nico-political possession” (Derrida 2009, 113). In the following passage from 
Totality and Infinity, Levinas develops his description of the other who “is other 
with an alterity that is not formal, is not the simple reverse of identity, and is not 
formed out of resistance to the same, but is prior to every initiative, to all impe-
rialism of the same. It is other with an alterity constitutive of the very content of 
the other. Other with an alterity that does not limit the same, for in limiting the 
same the other would not be rigorously other: by virtue of the common frontier the 






of power or mastery. As Derrida points out in his eulogy for Louis 
Martin, “[d]eath, or rather mourning, the mourning of the absolute of 
force: that is the name, or one of the names, of this affect that unites 
force to the without-force [...]” (Derrida 2001a, 147). To approach the 
other in a responsible manner should then perhaps lead to the affirma-
tion of weakness, which “implies a certain disarming quality in one’s 
relation to the other” (Derrida, Ferrari 2001, 63). It means perhaps that 
in mourning one would have to surrender their ambition to master the 
other, and therefore, one would have to disturb the absolute power by 
means of which a universal understanding and a law of equal grievabi-
lity could be established and enacted. Consequently, it would mean that 
the injunction of equal grievability would lead to the following paradox 
or a double bind: on the one hand, it would aim at weakening of the 
power of the sovereign over the decision as to which lives are grievable 
and which are ungrievable, but on the other, it would have to rely on 
some sort of sovereign power to establish and protect the universal law 
of equal grievability.
From Grievability to Equality
Now, every effort to establish the essence of life or bond between living 
beings must succumb to this inevitable logic of “the trace” and originary 
mourning, which, in turn, would mean that its validity is relative and 
its emergence outside of the structure of iterability is merely a metaphy-
sical illusion. Butler’s view expressed in Dispossession: The Performative 
in the Political seems to fit this framework. As she points out, “under-
standing something about the conditions of achieving singularity within 
a given field of intelligibility [...] is the question of the normative pre-
conditions for achieving grievability. We are perhaps back to the conun-
drum of structure and instance” (Butler, Athanasiou 2013, 134).
This conundrum boils down to the aporia of inscribing absolute 
singularity into the regime of possibility, and it conforms to the “law” 
of spectral contamination expressed in the above passage from Of Gram-
matology, where the possible is given a chance but only at the price of 
giving up on its alleged purity. This aporia “installs the haunting” (Der-
rida 1993: 20) within the ontological precisely by what the latter’s unfol-
ding tries to leave behind. Moreover, hauntology would harbor within 
itself any ontology, eschatology, teleology, or archeology as provisional 
places or effects (Derrida 2011, 10). The haunting would give voice to 





late its approach ad infinitum. This would mean that politics should not 
only be aware of haunting but affirm it. In fact, without hauntology, 
there would be no reason for politics whatsoever, as Ernesto Laclau 
rightly notices: “[w]ithout the constitutive dislocation that inhabits all 
hauntology – and that ontology tries to conceal – there would be no 
politics, just a programed, predetermined reduction of the other to the 
same” (Laclau 2007, 67). The political injunction would therefore urge 
us to take specters into account and not to exorcise them. It would thus 
send us into
[...] the instability of an anxiety belonging to any possibilization. This would 
submit to being haunted by the specter of its impossibility, by mourning itself: 
the mourning of itself borne in itself, but which also gives it its life or its survi-
val, its very possibility. For this im-possibility opens its possibility, it leaves a trace, 
both a chance and a threat, in what it makes possible. (Derrida 2005a, 88)
Consequently, life’s emergence has to rely on this originary haunting 
that corrupts any ontological category or norm. It means that life has 
to attest to its profound contamination by death, which conditions the 
constitution of any individual presence any social bond. What it also 
means is that we cannot simply exclude specters from the domain of 
politics (of responsibility) or treat them as an unwelcome or undesired 
residue of normative production. While in her texts on grievability and 
precariousness Butler expresses awareness at least of the irreducibility of 
the spectral and of what remains after a life emerges within the political 
domain, in “Finishing, Starting,” dedicated to Derrida’s thought, she 
emphasizes that “[t]he question of politics resides [...] in the encounter 
with what troubles the norm of sameness” (Butler 2009, 298).7
By the same logic, what undoes (but also conditions) any framing 
is the haunting by what is not identifiable as a life, namely, by an ungrie-
vable living “that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, 
it has never counted as a life at all” (Butler 2016, 38). Butler speaks here 
about those “others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable” 
(Butler 2016, 24), to wit, “effectively, socially dead” (Butler 2020, 59). 
But, as Derrida points out in Specters of Marx, “[t]his non-presence of 
the specter demands that one take its times and its history into consi-
7 In the same text, Butler states that we are never quite free of “specters, 
ghosts, traces” when freedom, as a display of autonomy and auto-mobility of 
a subject, is at stake. Freedom can emerge only on the condition that it is already 
compromised, “disavowing the sites from which it does emerge, only to have those 
sites reemerge as the haunted grounds of its own possibility” (Butler 2009, 298).
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deration, the singularity of its temporality or of its historicity” (Derrida 
2011, 126). So, once again, we return to the aporia of inscribing the 
singularity in the realms of possibility and subjecting the other to the 
hegemonic perspective of the sovereign same. But, since specters are 
inherently elusive to appropriation, “[t]he subject that haunts is not 
identifiable, one cannot see, localize, fix any form, one cannot decide 
between hallucination and perception, there are only displacements; 
one feels oneself looked at by what one cannot see” (Derrida 2011, 
169-170), by someone or something that belongs neither to the essence 
of life nor death (Derrida 2011, 62).
While, on the one hand, in Butler’s view, the frame prohibits from 
mourning those who do not count as lives – “there is no destruction, 
and there is no loss” (Butler 2016, xiii) – on the other, what Butler fails 
to mention is that the return of the specter also interrupts the work of 
mourning encompassed by the frame which attests to “the ratified ver-
sion of reality” (Butler 2016, xiii). However, one could still infer this 
second conclusion, for example, from the following passage:
What is this specter that gnaws at the norms of recognition, an intensified figure 
vacillating as its inside and its outside? As inside, it must be expelled to purify 
the norm; as outside, it threatens to undo the boundaries that limn the self. In 
either case, it figures the collapsibility of the norm; in other words, it is a sign 
that the norm functions precisely by way of managing the prospect of its undo-
ing, an undoing that inheres in its doings. (Butler 2016, 12)
Nevertheless, I argue that the frame must fail in its functioning by 
virtue of the spectral interruption of the work of mourning to which, 
after all, Butler attests (Butler 2016, 7). Furthermore, it seems that the 
normative differentiation between grievable and ungrievable lives is 
violently imposed on the originary violence of iterability. On the one 
hand, we are facing the derealization of the other, who, thereby, is 
“neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral” (Butler 2004, 33-34). 
On the other, we have those who fit the frames of life worthy of our 
grief. That is where Butler sets normative ontological production against 
the realm of spectrality. Since “[t]hese normative frameworks establish 
in advance what kind of life will be a life worth living, what life will be 
a life worth preserving, and what life will become worthy of being 
mourned” (Butler 2016, 53), then according to Butler, the exclusion to 





mark” (Butler 2004, 36)8 or “barely a trace” (Butler 2020, 75), and 
results in fatal political consequences:
If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of 
violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already 
negated. But they have a strange way of remaining animated and so must be 
negated again (and again). They cannot be mourned because they are always 
already lost or, rather, never “were,” and they must be killed, since they seem to 
live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness. (Butler 2004, 33)
However, Butler seems to disregard the threats which might stem from 
reactive, organized, and successful mourning. Yet, the question of who 
counts as a worthy life is strictly connected to forces that organize mour-
ning. Such mourning would mean that those who count as lives worth 
living are nevertheless subjected to ontological violence and treated as 
ancillary to politically determined norms and categories. The work of 
mourning may also result in turning any bereaved and worthy life into 
a monument which in extreme cases might serve as a justification for 
the violence inflicted upon those who are unworthy of being mourned.9
Haunting by a specter of the other would unsettle those totalizing 
processes, but at the same time, it would make mourning possible – 
however, only as a failure of successful mourning. In a similar vein, 
Butler admits that “mourning would be maintained by its enigmatic 
dimension, by the experience of not knowing incited by losing what we 
cannot fully fathom” (Butler 2004, 22), namely, by the impossibility of 
turning the other into the same, whether we are speaking about a monu-
ment, an image, a subject, or a frame. In any case, precisely in order to 
overcome the violence that stems from the differentiation between grie-
vable and ungrievable lives, Butler proposes to establish a presumption 
of equal grievability as “a principle that organizes the social organization 
of health, food, shelter, employment, sexual life, and civic life” (Butler 
2020, 59), which would be a response to tendencies to intensify “the 
8 However, this can be true only in a situation when ontology is opposed to 
hauntology.
9 Regarding the problem of monumentalization, I would like to evoke a so-
-called “controversy” around a remark of Chris Hayes (a political commentator 
for MSNBC) about Memorial Day in the USA. He stated: “I feel uncomfortable 
about the word ‘hero’ because it seems to me that it is so rhetorically proximate 
to justifications for more war. And I obviously don’t want to desecrate or disrespect 
the memory of anyone that’s fallen” (The Nation’s Editors 2012). Eventually, and 
sadly, under the pressure of American public opinion, he apologized for this valid 





difference among the value accorded to lives and their very grievability” 
(Butler 2020, 143).
As a response to the possibility that a life may be lost and that this 
loss would be mourned, grievability has to imply that such a life is not 
only mortal but also vulnerable. Therefore, according to Butler, grieva-
bility has to presuppose and expose precariousness as an elementary 
condition of such a life. Now, if this life is deemed worthy of mourning, 
and if our ability to value life, in general, relies on “an ongoing sense of 
its grievability” (Butler 2020, 76), then we also have to acknowledge 
that this life needs to be safeguarded (Butler 2020, 94), namely, that it 
requires social and economic conditions which would prevent its damage 
and in which such a life could be livable. This leads, according to Butler, 
to a recognition of life’s dependency on others: “Precariousness implies 
living socially, that is, the fact that one’s life is always in some sense in 
the hands of the other” (Butler 2016, 14). On the basis of this assump-
tion, Butler argues that
[...] the unequal distribution of grievability might be one framework for under-
standing the differential production of humans and other creatures within 
a structure of inequality, or, indeed, within a structure of violent disavowal. 
(Butler 2020, 58)
Such a realization could provide an alternative to popular liberal appro-
aches, which, in an effort to address the issue of inequalities, disregard 
the interdependency between lives in favor of what Butler calls “an 
ontology of discrete identity” (Butler 2016, 31). However, in order to 
safeguard every life from exploitation and violence, precariousness “has 
to be grasped not simply as a feature of this or that life, but as a gene-
ralized condition whose very generality can be denied only by denying 
precariousness itself ” (Butler 2016, 22). Therefore, the generalized con-
dition of precariousness has to function on a par with “the radically 
egalitarian character of grievability” (Butler 2016, 183). Following the 
presupposition of the general character of precariousness, Butler pro-
poses a shared horizon of equality as a politico-ethical challenge that 
consists in establishing an imperative that every life should be grievable, 
and thus, worthy of protection.
Conversely, since there is no effective interdiction of violence against 
those who do not meet the threshold of grievability, violence perpetra-
ted against lives or populations would directly result from an unequal 
allocation of grievability. Thus, the egalitarian injunction that Butler 
proclaims has to coincide with the call for nonviolence and a radical 
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critique of inequality. Furthermore, at the heart of what she calls the 
politics of equality we must pose a demand according to which to insist 
“that every life be grievable is another way of saying that all lives ought 
to be able to persist in their living without being subject to violence, 
systemic abandonment, or military obliteration” (Butler 2020, 202). 
This normative principle or aspiration should lead us to a “more radical 
and effective form of egalitarianism” (Butler 2016, xxii) which would, 
in turn, address the issue of economic inequalities and the unequal 
distribution of precariousness in a more comprehensive manner than 
the existing political models.
Mourning as Living (On) Together
This call for egalitarianism finds its support in shared precariousness and 
the interdependency of lives. Butler argues that mutual reliance and 
common vulnerability stem from the exposure of our lives, as bodily 
lives, to others. This, in turn, allows her to put the very question of 
survival in the context of our constitutive sociality. According to her, 
“we are already tied together in a social bond that precedes and makes 
possible both of our lives. My life is not altogether separable from the 
other life ” (Butler 2020, 93). While she emphasizes the carnality or 
physicality of our lives as the domain of precariousness, Butler also 
mentions that the emergence of a subject depends “on the ones whose 
definition of me gives me form” (Butler 2020, 101), which amounts to 
the possibility of inheriting our identity trough language. Therefore, the 
constitution of a social bond should be based not solely on corporeality 
but on the emergence of the social body as a site of contamination of 
corporeality by the process of ideation which “gives birth to me as a social 
creature” (Butler 2020, 101). The sense of social responsibility paves the 
way for the acknowledgment of our collective responsibility. While “[l]
oss and vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially constituted 
bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed 
to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure” (Butler 2004, 
20), Butler also warns of immunization against vulnerability, which 
would lead to the eradication of “one of the most important resources 
from which we must take our bearings and find our way” (Butler 2004, 
30). In fact, eradication like that would stand in contradiction to what 
constitutes us as social beings, namely, to an address to the other or 
rather an address that is already a response, which Derrida calls a coun-





by the movement of iterability: “we are constituted by virtue of the 
address, a need and desire for the Other that takes place in language in 
the broadest sense” (Butler 2004, 44); the subject can be sustained only 
“through the formation of a capacity to sustain an address to another” 
(Butler 2016, 176).
However, I wonder if Butler takes all the consequences of such a radi-
cal – without a doubt necessarily radical – approach into account. If 
this constitutive address to the other is carried out as iterable, if it is 
already a response to a loss of presence, then: 
(1) It cannot be based on a general conviction of shared grievability 
and originality of the social bond since all those ties are, in a way, alre-
ady troubled and undone by the loss of the other. This social bonding, 
already inscribed in the movement of iterability, takes place without 
taking place, to wit, “[w]ithout any possible gathering together” (Derrida 
2011, 2). Therefore, Butler seems right to admit that “we may need 
other language to approach the issue that concerns us, a way of thinking 
about how we are not only constituted by our relations but also dispos-
sessed by them as well” (Butler 2004, 24). But this urgent need for a new 
language, a new political discourse also stems from the spectral charac-
ter of every social link, which, as such, requires constant reevaluation 
and reformulation, if not reinvention.10
Because haunting becomes the exact condition of the politics of 
equality, social bonds, on which Butler’s discourse on equality relies, 
cannot be exempted from mourning. Just like we mourn others, we 
mourn the elusive and fragile ties that have been keeping us together. 
To think of equality in the context of originary mourning would perhaps 
10 From this point of view, politics, as Jacques Rancière argues, would have 
no arche – it would be anarchical (which would coincide with the anarchistic 
aspiration of deconstruction to challenge any claim of ultimate political authority 
or foundation). Consequently, equality could be confirmed not by resorting to 
some principle of kinship but through its enactment by means of polemical veri-
fication. Therefore, social equality would be  “a way of living out the relation 
between equality and inequality, of living it and at the same time displacing it in 
a positive way” (Rancière 2006, 48). This labor of conflictual verification would 
involve an infinite task of constructing subjectivity as “the formation of a one that 
is not a self but is the relation of a self to an other” (Rancière 1992, 60). It would 
mean that “the logic of political subjectivization, of emancipation, is a heterology, 
a logic of the other” (Rancière 1992, 62). Since for Rancière anarchism has to be 
presupposed in democracy, the latter would have to be engaged with “the continual 
renewal of the actors and of the forms of their actions, the ever-open possibility 
of the fresh emergence of the fleeting subject. The test of democracy must be in 






mean to approach an irresolvable aporia: “But it may be that I cannot 
give the measure of equality its true sense unless I maintain the absence 
of common measure that is my relation to autrui. An equality of what 
is nevertheless radically unequal” (Blanchot 2003, 64). Thus, we would 
be facing the impossibility of translating an irreducible difference 
between us and the other into a shared condition of equality. Entangled 
in the double bind, the chance to access “the whoever or the no matter 
who of singularity” (Derrida 2005c, 52) by means of calculable measure, 
sometimes against hegemonic powers and dominating political interests, 
would emerge as “an autoimmune threat. For calculating technique 
obviously destroys or neutralizes the incommensurable singularity to 
which it gives effective access” (Derrida 2005c, 53).
(2) As a response to an already lost presence, the address remains, 
from the outset, engrossed in mourning. In this context, I would like 
to touch on a sparse appearance of the notion of demography in The 
Force of Non-Violence. Butler argues there that while demography is 
concerned with discursive representation of lives and populations, and 
consequently, it is involved in the process of evaluation which lives are 
worth preserving and which are not, she also poses a question which 
undeniably takes the form of a political accusation: “By what graphic 
means would we distinguish between the grievable and the ungrievable?” 
(Butler 2020, 104). This question/accusation may be considered disar-
med by Butler a few pages earlier where she argues that the principle of 
equal grievability could be posed as “the demographic precondition” 
(Butler 2020, 56) for ethics to come. Here, I would like to deepen this 
question and to think of graphos (in the sense of iterable arche-writing) 
as the possibility of emergence of any demos, and simultaneously, any 
apprehension of grievability. Would that not mean that what is written 
or traced is already in (originary) mourning? And what would the living 
(on) together of a demos inscribed in the movement of the trace or 
iterability, and thus already seized by mourning, possibly mean? Perhaps, 
in Jacques Rancière’s words, the demos could then be “at the same time 
the name of a community and the name for its division, for the handling 
of a wrong” (Rancière 1992, 59), perceived however not as an evolutio-
nary or teleologic project, but closer to Derrida’s intention, as a disjo-
inture always threatened by the evil “against which there is no calculable 
insurance” (Derrida 2011, 32).
Mourning encapsulates or stands for living together, that is, also, 
living together with the dead, which “is not an accident, a miracle, or 
an extraordinary story. It is rather an essential possibility of existence. 





nor dominant even if it remains irreducible” (Derrida 2013, 20). In 
living together, we challenge the existing norms and social bonds, cohe-
siveness or coherence of a socius, and at the same time, the phantasm of 
symbiotic or fusional life, the very concept of life, and the ontological 
arrest of being-together. Because of its structural discordance with tota-
lization, such a living together would be reducible “neither to organic 
symbiosis nor to the juridico-political contract. Neither to ‘life’ according 
to nature or birth, blood or soil, nor to life according to convention, 
contract, or institution” (Derrida 2013, 27).
Therefore, it comes down to imperious necessity to contest the autho-
rity of the whole as the ultimate foundation of all living together. Only 
then can we think of living together in terms of iterability, to wit, as 
conditioned by différance that, as Butler explains, at the same time “rifts 
the ‘we’ and proves its impossibility as a unity without difference [...] 
and there is no way around this double bind” (Butler 2009, 297).
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Tytuł: Żałoba i opłakiwalność: Kilka uwag na temat polityki życia razem Judith 
Butler
Abstrakt: W swoim artykule skupiam się na funkcji pojęć kruchości i opłakiwal-
ności życia w pismach Judith Butler i rozpatruję ich miejsce w szerszym kontekście 
myśli o tym, co za Jacques’em Derridą nazywam „źródłową żałobą”. Z jednej strony 
zatem chcę zrekonstruować stawiane przez Butler wyzwanie, polegające na przemy-
śleniu możliwości stworzenia wspólnoty bazującej na równym przydziale kruchości 
i opłakiwalności życia, który pozwala Butler na potraktowanie opłakiwalności jako 
przenikliwej i wyjątkowej ścieżki do problematyki ochrony żywych istot i równości 
między nimi. Z drugiej strony, odnosząc się do pism Derridy, wpisuję zaproponowane 
przez Butler pojęcia kruchości i opłakiwalności w szerszą strukturę żałoby, aby poka-
zać, jak wszelkie formowanie więzi społecznych zasadzające się na wspólnej krucho-
ści i podatności na zranienie musi nieustannie konfrontować się z paradoksem 
własnej genezy.
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